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Introduction 
The Next Generation Broadband Taskforce (the Taskforce) made 51 recommendations designed to 
increase the use and penetration of high speed broadband in Ireland in its May 2012 report, 
Enabling a Connected Society.  The recommendations reflected the Taskforce’s purpose of not only 
highlighting “the legislative, policy and regulatory levers that will facilitate greater investment in high 
speed broadband services across Ireland” but also identifying “where gaps in commercial service 
provision are likely to occur between now and 2020” (NGBT, 2012, p. 6).
1
  The Taskforce was thus 
very much a nuts and bolts examination of when and how high speed broadband will and could be 
rolled out across the State in an efficient and effective way.  This emphasis on the practicalities was 
reflected in the five working groups which dealt with issues such as targets for high speed 
broadband, demand stimulation, and infrastructural barrier removal. To a large extent the benefits 
of high speed broadband were accepted based on various studies (ibid, p. 10).
2
  The emphasis on 
implementation of high speed broadband rollout reflects the Programme for Government’s proposal 




To take the Taskforce’s agenda forward, the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural 
Resources launched on 2 May 2012 a month long consultation exercise “on how to best facilitate the 
provision of high speed broadband” (DCENR, 2012).  It is then anticipated that soon after the 
consultation process is completed that Ireland’s new National Broadband Plan will be finalised and 
published in July 2012.  Our submission to the consultation exercise concentrates on three areas: 
removal of regulatory barriers; measures to increase demand; and, the provision of high speed 
broadband to homes and businesses where private operators are unlikely to provide such a service.
4
  
The first two areas are concerned with what the Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural 
Resources (the Minister) refers to as “how to facilitate the rollout, by commercial market operators” 
of high speed broadband, while the last area is concerned with “if the Government is to intervene to 
address possible market failure, what is the best way to do so?” (NGBT, 2012, p. 4). 
A key issue to which we return several times in this discussion is in what ways and to what extent 
the State should intervene in broadband markets.  Some possible interventions are essentially 
regulatory in character and can be analysed using the tools of regulatory impact analysis (e.g. 
Department of the Taoiseach, 2009).  Others involve public spending. Honohan (1997, p.76) sets out 
a useful classification of economic rationales for public expenditure: 
                                                           
1
 The Digital Agenda for Europe has set certain targets to be achieved by 2020 for the EU: 30Mbps broadband 
available to all citizens and 50 per cent of households subscribing to 100Mbps. (NGBT, 2012, p. 31). 
2
 These studies include, for example, Forfas (2011).  However, as discussed below, recent reviews of the 
literature on high speed broadband cast considerable doubt on the need for State intervention to promote 
high speed broadband due to market failure. 
3
 The Programme for Government states: “NewERA will co-invest with the private sector and commercial semi 
State sector to provide next generation broadband to every home and business in the state.  This will be 
achieved by delivering fibre to the home or kerb for 90% of homes and businesses … with the remaining 10% 
provided by high speed mobile or satellite broadband.” Department of the Taoiseach (2011).  The Department 
of Finance (2012, p. 14) while also making the commitment of NewERA involvement, only mentions significant 
investment in next generation broadband without committing to the targets in the Programme for 
Government. 
4
 Other issues are discussed in the NGBT report, for example to do with methods for assigning spectrum, but 
we do not address them in this submission. 
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• Provision of public goods; 
• Corrective subsidies that aim to correct the relative prices that firms face, ensuring that they 
take into account the full societal costs and benefits of services in cases where there is some 
externality associated with the service.  “Characteristically these are largely passive grant 
schemes where the administration of the scheme is confined to ensuring that it is reaching 
the target group and delivering the intended change in relative prices – with perhaps an eye 
also to minimising deadweight” (ibid, p. 76); 
• Targeted schemes intended to address problems of imperfect information in markets or to 
correct a specific externality: “...these involve a much more active administration, greater 
selectivity and considerable value added in the form of training or advice” (ibid, p. 76); and  
• Subsidies primarily intended to be redistributional. 
The vital first step in choosing the optimal mix of expenditure and/or regulatory measures is to 
ensure that the instruments chosen fit the problems identified.  We will refer back to the framework 
above when discussing the appropriate role of the State in the context of the Taskforce 
recommendations. 
Next generation or high speed broadband refers to broadband access services with higher data 
transmission speeds than those currently provided to most households and small businesses.  At the 
present time through a combination of provision by individual firms and several State-funded 
interventions, the most recent of which is the National Broadband Scheme (NBS),
5
 basic broadband 
is available throughout Ireland.  The Taskforce addressed the issue of how to facilitate increasing the 
speed at which broadband is provided.  Whereas the basic broadband offers download speeds of 3-
10 Mbps, high speed broadband refers to download speeds up to 100Mbps.  To use an analogy from 
another technology it is like moving from subsonic to a supersonic passenger airliner (Kenny and 
Kenny, 2011, p. 4). 
Removal of Regulatory and Other Infrastructure Barriers 
The Taskforce argues that extending the availability of high speed broadband requires significant 
infrastructural works.
6
  In particular, new mobile and fixed wireless technologies will require over 
2,000 new installations.  Fibre to the home or cabinet and backhaul infrastructure will require road 
openings and extra civil works.  The Taskforce identified certain barriers relating to the rollout of 
high speed broadband infrastructure: planning processes for masts and antennas; and the 
administrative processes associated with the installation of street infrastructure (such as cabinets) 
and the installation of underground road works relating to broadband infrastructure.  These barriers 
include high variation in local authority charges (i.e. contributions) for masts and antennas, the fact 
permission for a mast or antenna lasts for only five years before a renewal is required, despite the 
fact that the typical life of a mast is much longer than five years, and that 61 per cent of the several 
hundred appeals to An Bord Pleanala against local authority decisions to refuse a mast were 
                                                           
5
 The NBS, completed in 2010, provided broadband to “designated electoral divisions in rural Ireland where 
coverage was deemed to be insufficient” (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2011. p. 363).  See also: 
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Communications/Communications+Development/National+Broadband+Scheme. 
Accessed 16 May 2012.  Earlier schemes are summarised in Forfas (2011, Textbox, 1, p. 34). For a careful 
examination of one of these schemes, the metropolitan area networks, see Woods (2005). 
6
 This paragraph draws heavily on NGBT (2012, pp. 15-16, pp. 48-59). 
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successful.  Such appeals are not only time consuming and resource intensive, but suggest an 
inconsistency in the approach of the local authorities and An Bord Pleanala.  In view of these 
barriers, the Taskforce make a series of recommendations including fair and transparent planning 
charges and development contributions.  Indeed, the existence of the Taskforce itself has led to 
some improvement in the processes for applying for a road opening.
7
 
The identification of the regulatory and other barriers to infrastructure development and proposals 
to remove the barriers is sensible.  Transaction costs should be reduced with greater transparency in 
local authority procedures, common application forms and methodology with respect to mast, 
antennas and road openings.  Predictability and certainty will increase if there is greater congruence 
between the decisions of local authorities and the planning appeal body, An Bord Pleanala.  Explicit 
or implicit local authority rules that lead to decisions that are routinely overturned by An Bord 
Pleanala should be reconsidered.
8
  A forum between high speed broadband providers and local 
authorities should facilitate the identification and resolution of infrastructure problems at an early 
stage.  The sharing of high speed broadband infrastructure provided this can be achieved in a way 
that does not infringe competition law, is likely to lower costs for providers and any disamenity costs 
to the public.
9
  To the extent that the removal of infrastructure barriers lowers marginal costs of the 
provision of high speed broadband it will, other things equal, increase the penetration of 
commercially driven high speed broadband services and reduce the need for any further 
government intervention, an issue we return to below. 
On the issue of local authority development charges for masts and antennas the Taskforce states 
that “industry representatives … indicated that while they are prepared to make a fair contribution, 
the level of charges are acting as a disincentive to investment” (NGBT, 2012, p. 49).  The corollary is 
a recommendation that a methodology be developed to determine what is fair and that this is done 
in transparent manner (ibid, p. 54).  A similar approach is taken with respect to road works (ibid, pp. 
56-58).  Whether or not the local authority development charges act as disincentive or barrier to the 
rollout of high speed broadband is not the issue.  Rather the issue is whether or not the charges are 
set correctly, since any positive charge acts as a disincentive.  In this context it is not clear what the 
term fair means, since it is inherently a subjective concept open to many different interpretations.  It 
is possible that charges will be set too high, for example if they are used by local authorities as a 
revenue raising tool, or too low, for example if there is national pressure to roll out high speed 
broadband quickly.  In order to avoid unnecessary economic distortions we suggest that charges be 
set based on any administrative costs incurred by the local authorities plus the disamenity of the 
particular infrastructure project.  To relate this to our earlier discussion on reasons for public 
expenditure (which can be read analogously for taxes), we think development charges for 
infrastructure should be used as a corrective measure rather than as a discretionary tax instrument 
for local authorities. 
                                                           
7
 For a discussion see NGBT (2011, pp. 56-58). 
8
 For example, under the Kerry County Development Plan for 2009-2015 planning permission for masts within 
1km of residential properties, schools, hospitals, or any structure where there is human occupancy for 
residential or daily work purposes contravenes the Plan. An Bord Pleanala often overturns decisions taken on 
this basis.  See, for example, An Bord Pleanala (2011).  
9
 The same point concerning competition law is also relevant to the discussion of spectrum sharing and 
pooling, as noted by the NGBT (2012, pp. 64-65). 
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Disamenity refers to the costs generated by the infrastructure development that are not borne 
directly by those developing the infrastructure.
10
  In other words, these costs, or unpriced 
externalities, are borne by the wider society.  In the case of a road opening it would be costs such as 
the increased traffic congestion and loss of business to commercial premises adjacent to the road 
openings; in the case of masts and antennas it would, for example, be the visual unattractiveness of 
masts in prominent places in the countryside (e.g. on top of a mountain) and/or close to homes.  
Since the cost of the disamenity is likely to vary by location – a road opening on a busy road will 
generate more congestion costs than a similar opening on a quiet minor road – then the local 
authority charges will also vary.  However, that does not mean that the methodology by which 
charges are estimated cannot be agreed, so that when using infrastructure to develop high speed 
broadband, telecommunications firms will be in a position to determine with reasonable accuracy 
what the charge will be and what information the local authority will need in order to set the charge. 
In addition to the measures discussed in the Taskforce report, we have previously suggested that the 
incentive properties of road opening charges could be improved by taking into account the time 
dimension of development, for example by switching from fixed up-front charges to lane rental 
charges (Gorecki et al., 2011, p.14). 
Stimulating Demand for Broadband Services 
On the demand side the Taskforce notes two not altogether unrelated issues with respect to 
broadband.
11
  First, not all households and businesses use broadband, despite its wide availability.  
Second, there is a danger a digital divide developing whereby the disadvantaged and marginalised in 
society do not have access to broadband and thus are not in a position to fully participate in society.  
In order to address these problems, the Taskforce makes a number of recommendations.  These 
include development of an advertising campaign, jointly funded between Government and industry, 
aimed at target groups not currently broadband enabled, particularly the SME sector; that the 
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (DCNER) should together with 
stakeholders develop a new National Digital Strategy; that financial incentives for those not digitally 
engaged to purchase hardware (e.g. a subsidy for PCs/laptops or phased deduction from a claimants 
weekly welfare payments) and to get connectivity (e.g. Department of Social Welfare household 
benefits package be structured so households better able to shop around so encouraging 
competition in service provision); and increase in eWorking at home through, for example, the civil 
service acting as an exemplar by substantially increasing availability of eWorking. 
While it is undoubtedly the case that many households and some businesses do not subscribe to 
broadband service it is not clear that large advertising campaigns and financial incentives are 
justified.  What is the counterfactual?  What is likely to happen based on unchanged policies?  The 
evidence suggests that broadband penetration at the household level in Ireland has not only been 
increasing, but that the gap between Ireland and the EU-27 average has narrowed considerably.  In 
2010 and 2011 the difference was three percentage points (EU-27, 68 per cent, Ireland, 65 per cent); 
                                                           
10
 This is discussed further in Gorecki et al. (2011, pp. 6-8). 
11
 This paragraph draws heavily on NGBT (2012, p. 14-15, pp. 39-47). 
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in 2004, 12 percentage points (15 and 3 per cent, respectively).
12
  The vast majority of Irish 
enterprises now use broadband too; the share has grown from 76 per cent in 2009 to 91 per cent in 
2011 (CSO, 2011, p.1).  Thus it is not clear that additional intervention is necessary given the 
increasing penetration of broadband over time.  Furthermore the benefits of any intervention – in 
terms of increased penetration - would need to be measured relative to what is likely to happen 
based on unchanged policies.  If, for example, household broadband penetration is likely to increase 
to (say) 70 per cent in 2016, then any policy intervention could only claim responsibility for the 
excess above 70 per cent. 
There is also little published evidence on whether advertising campaigns are a cost effective way to 
increase broadband penetration in the relevant target groups, and still less on whether this leads to 
societal benefits in excess of the private benefits that accrue to customers and suppliers.  More 
research should be carried out before the State could justify such expenditure.  It is, of course, a 
matter for participants in the industry whether they wish to collaborate on a private campaign to 
encourage broadband adoption. 
The Taskforce recommends specific measures to encourage adoption in groups with particularly low 
penetration rates such as those on low incomes.  In order to increase broadband connectivity 
amongst the disadvantaged the Taskforce recommends financial incentives in order to increase 
access.  More work would need to be done on the costs, benefits and the nature of the problem to 
be addressed before these recommendations are implemented.  This would entail several steps.   
First, what market failures are the proposed policies trying to correct?  The measures used should be 
tailored to the problem that is identified.  For example, if under-adoption were mainly due to lack of 
information, that would imply a different set of measures (targeted) than if it were mainly caused by 
credit constraints (corrective) or simple lack of income among the relevant groups (redistributive).  
Second, what is the extent of household broadband penetration for these groups and how is it 
expected to develop in the near future?  Third, to what extent do members of disadvantaged 
households already access internet services through other channels: Internet cafes; libraries; other 
local WiFi hotspots; Local Employment Offices where individuals can conduct job search and make 
applications using telephone and fax, substitutes for the Internet; and, through friends and relations 
to, for example, book an airline flight.  Fourth, how much are these measures likely to cost, are they 
compatible with existing strategies for vulnerable groups (e.g. the National Poverty Strategy) and will 
they earn high enough societal benefits to justify their cost.  The suggestion of phased deductions to 
pay for PCs/laptops sounds administratively complex at a time when the Department of Social 
Protection is under considerable strain given the demand for its services and continued pressure on 
government expenditure.  Furthermore, there is a danger that the PC/laptop supplied at a subsidised 
price might simply be resold rather than used by the targeted household to access the Internet. 
To the extent that SMEs do not use broadband when it is available to, for example, order supplies or 
sell to consumers, it is still not clear that there is a need for demand stimulation as the Taskforce 
argues via an awareness campaign.  Apart from the fact that the basic Internet access is ubiquitous, 
there are already bodies such as County and City Enterprise Boards and Enterprise Ireland that 
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 For details see ComReg (2012, Table 3.4.2., p. 41).  These data are consistent with the household budget 
survey, which finds that the percentage of households with Internet access increased from 14.2 per cent in 
1999-2000, to 42.2 per cent in 2004-2005 to 65.8 per cent in 2009-2010 (CSO, 2012, Table Q, p. 33). 
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provide advice on business strategy and practice.  Before any awareness campaign is undertaken at 
a minimum the success of advice and information already dispensed by these and other bodies such 
as the Small Firms Association and the Irish Small and Medium Enterprises Association would need 
to be established.  What extra needs to be added?  What are the likely costs compared to the 
benefits? 
The Taskforce also recommends as part of demand simulation that there should be an increase in 
eWorking with the public sector setting an example in this respect.  Such a move would lead to an 
increase in demand for Internet services in the home, since some homes may decide to access the 
Internet so as to take advantage of eWorking.  The Taskforce argue that the concept of eWorking “is 
rapidly becoming the norm in many segments of the economy with consequent savings for those 
who are willing to embrace it” (NGBT, 2012, p. 42).  This raises an obvious question: if this is the case 
why is there a need for the public sector to promote eWorking?  Is there any sense in which the 
public sector might be unaware of the advantages of eWorking and hence underutilising this work 
practice?  Are there mechanisms that bias the choice in favour of working in the office as compared 
with home – such as subsidised parking – that could be removed so as to ensure that eWorking is 
considered on its merits? In other words, more work and research needs to be conducted before this 
recommendation is implemented. 
Targets for Broadband Rollout 
The Taskforce considers the likely extent of commercially available broadband in two dimensions: 
the speed of the broadband connection, up to a maximum of 100Mbps; and the geographical 
coverage.
13
  Higher broadband speeds mean that different applications and technology can be used.  
For example, for speeds up to 20Mbps users can “access voice-over-Internet, fast browsing, high 
definition television, file sharing and video conferencing” (NGBT, 2012, p. 32).  Much higher speeds 
are used for a narrower specialist range of tasks such as for a Virtual Health Care Unit, Remote 
Diagnostic Examinations, HD Education Fast Downloads (ibid, Figure 1, p. 33).  At present demand 
tends to be concentrated in the lower broadband speeds, rather than 80 to 100Mbps, reflecting the 
speeds used by consumer electronics and content services.  The evidence suggests users purchase 
speeds appropriate to their uses.  In terms of geographical coverage, commercial operators are 
more likely to supply high density urban areas, where the costs of delivery per household or business 
tend to be lower.  Here, the return for a given investment will be higher compared to the costs of 
servicing more rural dispersed populations.  Indeed, the market may not provide high speed 
broadband to certain parts of the country.   
Taking these two aspects of high speed broadband rollout the Taskforce recommends that:  
Government intervention could be considered necessary to provide high speed 
broadband services for the 15% to 30% of the population that may not be served 
through commercial investment (NGBT, 2012, p. 38). 
The Government may also wish to consider whether the speeds that are likely to be 
available to the other segments of the population, outside of urban areas, meet the 
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 This paragraph draws heavily on NGBT (2012, pp. 13-14, pp. 129-138). 
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needs of an emerging digital economy and society and whether there are further 
measures which could accelerate or improve services in this band (ibid, p. 38). 
Thus the Taskforce sensibly leaves open whether or not the State should intervene to support more 
extensive or timely geographical coverage of high speed broadband services.  It raises the issue but 
does not provide any analytical framework within which to evaluate whether the recommendations 
should be implemented.  Below we sketch out some of the factors that should guide such as 
decision. 
Just because high speed broadband is not provided by the market or if it is provided not to all 
consumers then this does not in and of itself represent a market failure that justifies State 
intervention.
14
  There is a distinction between the market failing to provide high speed broadband 
service to a remote community and market failure to provide the service.  The former simply means 
that the private costs are less than the private benefits.  Anticipated extra demand does not justify 
the cost of the additional high speed broadband provision.  In short, the commercial operator 
would make a loss on the additional broadband provision and hence does not provide the service.  
In the latter case wider considerations of the costs and benefits to society, that are not taken into 
account by the private operator, mean that high speed broadband service should be provided.
15
  
This is the case of a corrective subsidy, where the government needs to consider whether the 
overall benefits to society of the subsidised increase to provision are greater than the costs of 
inducing the increase.  Ideally, the subsidy will be offered only up to the point where the marginal 
subsidy equals the marginal societal benefit, and not beyond.   
Honohan (1997, p.92) offers a checklist for screening corrective measures that provides some 
pointers to what information will be required to assess a given proposal: 
(i) Is the adjustment to relative prices correct (given the externality being corrected for, 
and including the effect of deadweight)? 
(ii) Is the externality itself policy-induced, suggesting the possibility of a more direct 
correction? 
(iii) Is the budgetary provision in line with current projections of demand? 
Step 1 on this checklist requires identification of the wider benefits that are not taken into account 
by the market. These are referred to as spillovers or externalities.  Since the market does not take 
them into account they are referred to as unpriced externalities.
 16
  Hence within a market failure 
                                                           
14
 Some authors seem to use the term ‘market failure’ as if it were simple failure to supply.  For example, the 
the stated objectives of the National Broadband Scheme included “to address the market’s failure to provide 
broadband in the more rural parts of Ireland” (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2011, p. 363).  Forfás (2011, 
p. 5) also employ the term in a similar manner: “[T]he optimal solution is that telecommunications market 
players … undertake the necessary investment within the context of a supportive policy and regulatory 
framework with Government addressing areas of market failure. …. In the event that the market does not 
deliver in a timely fashion, this paper sets out the need for Government to ensure that Ireland has advanced 
broadband services to allow the enterprise base to compete successfully in international markets.”  
15
 However, public intervention is only warranted if the private sector will not provide the service, i.e. the 
private benefits are less than the private costs. 
16
 If they are priced they are taken into account and hence are not unpriced and there is no further reason for 
intervention by the State.  For example, an examination of a Ryanair ticket price shows an item “0.50 EUR 
Passenger Fee: ETS,” where the ETS refers to the system set up to price the environmental damage caused by 
plane travel.   
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framework, these externalities need to be identified and, to the extent possible, quantified.  If the 
benefits exceed the costs then attention needs to be devoted to the most appropriate method or 
instrument of intervention.  
A number of possible externalities can be identified as arising from faster broadband speeds.  As 
noted above there are educational and health applications and the benefits that derive from the use 
of these applications may not purely private.  For example, Casey et al. (2012) find a positive 
association between moderate use of home computers and some Internet applications by Irish 
primary school children and their scores on maths and reading tests. Better educated citizens are 
more likely to make a positive contribution that is not entirely captured in the person’s future 
income.  Society also has a broader interest in an educated and healthy society.  An important 
aspect of society is that citizens should participate fully.  Connectivity to one’s fellow citizens and the 
State is thus vitally important.  Broadband is significant in the latter aspect as an increasing 
proportion of the services provided by the State are mediated through the Internet.  However, it is 
not clear whether or not high speed broadband is needed compared to basic broadband to achieve 
such benefits.  Finally, there may be productivity gains from faster broadband which is external to a 
particular business but which is internal to a group of businesses in a particular location.  However, 
because of co-ordination failures these benefits may not be realised suggesting a role for the State 
to resolve. 
For high speed broadband, these externalities are only potential.  The evidence on the magnitude 
and correct identification of such externalities suggests that the case has as yet to be established.  In 
a recent  survey of the literature on high speed broadband, Kenny and Kenny (2011, p. 9) conclude, 
The argument for a government subsidy [for high speed broadband] at this point looks 
particularly threadbare because it is unclear the compelling market failure that the 
subsidy would overcome.  Multiple streaming TV on demand is not a technology that 
creates ‘network externalities’ like the telephone or email account.  I benefit from my 
ability to email or call you.  I do not benefit from your (little-exercised) ability to watch 
the Olympics in high-definition while the kids are streaming Toy Story III in the 
basement.  Fiber advocates have claimed externalities such as improved healthcare or 
reduced electricity consumption.  As we have seen, these benefits are frequently based 
on crediting fiber with applications that can work on basic broadband … or from benefits 
from taking business from business premises, not homes. 
Howell and Grimes (2010) in a paper that looks at the relationship between productivity and high 
speed broadband suggest a framework that should be employed before accepting the commonly 
advanced arguments for faster broadband speeds.  They argue, for example, that complementary 
investments may be required to get the full benefit of high speed broadband.  Even with regard to 
the scale of private benefits obtained from basic broadband there remains a live debate.  Greenstein 
and McDevitt (2011) identify weaknesses in many of the previous studies on the direct economic 
value added by basic broadband in the US and produce revised estimates, concluding that “... the 
scale of returns was not outsized.  It was comparable to the scale of monetary investment made by 
the suppliers.”
17
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 Greenstein and McDevitt (2011, p.630). 
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Not only would the benefits need to be estimated but also the costs.  The evidence suggests that 
supplying rural areas with broadband as compared to urban areas is much more expensive (TIF, 
2010), while high speed broadband is more expensive than the rollout of basic broadband (Kenny 
and Kenny, 2011, pp. 9-10).  Forfás (2011, Table 1, p. 36) estimate the cost of rolling out high speed 
broadband to all towns with a population over 1,500 as €2.23 billion.
18
   
The removal of barriers may serve to reduce the need for direct State intervention even where 
externalities are present, which relates to Step 2 on the checklist.  We have already discussed some 
of the useful suggestions made by the Taskforce in this area.   
While efficient procurement can keep the costs to a minimum such as the tendering process used by 
the DCENR for the National Broadband Scheme, attention also needs to be paid to anticipated 
demand (Step 3 above).  The unpriced externalities or benefits are only realised if the high speed 
broadband is actually used.  In the case of the National Broadband Scheme demand was 
substantially overestimated with the result that the subsidy per subscriber was twice that assumed 
in the cost benefit study justifying the National Broadband Scheme (Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2011, pp. 363-365).
19
  The international evidence suggests that such overestimation of 
demand is not unusual for infrastructure projects (Morgenroth, 2011, pp. 6-7).  There are also 
suggestions that the demand for high speed broadband may be lower than for basic broadband 
(Kenny and Kenny, 2011, pp. 16-17).  The risk of deadweight due to overlap between areas covered 
by a subsidy scheme and commercial provision should be considered.  Finally, as Honohan (1997, pp. 
79-80) points out, there is a cost involved in raising public funds (e.g. tax collection) as well as tax-
induced distortions (e.g. reduced output because of the tax wedge between pre and post income).  
Suppose, at the margin, it cost a €1 for every euro raised in tax, then the benefits from any State 
intervention to promote high speed broadband would need to be at least twice the cost before a 
public subsidy is merited.  
Conclusion 
The Government is to formulate a new National Broadband Plan in July 2012 based on the Taskforce 
report and the subsequent consultation exercise. We welcome proposals to address a number of 
areas on the supply side with respect to reducing or removing regulatory and other barriers to 
facilitate high speed broadband roll out.  Bringing greater clarity and consistency to the local 
planning process for telecommunications infrastructure should help encourage efficient investment.  
However, we believe it would be premature to undertake demand stimulation measures for high 
speed broadband or to initiate direct government support to provide high speed broadband to the 
15 to 30 per cent of the population that may not be served through commercial investment.  Here 
much more analysis is required.  The available evidence, at this time, is not sufficient to justify 
further public intervention via subsidy to promote high speed broadband.  We have suggested some 
possible approaches for determining whether public intervention is necessary, and if it is, finding the 
most appropriate set of instruments. Lessons also need to be learnt from the experience of rolling 
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 Much of this will, of course, be provided by the private sector as the Taskforce makes clear. 
19
 The cost benefit study is not available on the DCENR’s website page concerning the National Broadband 
Scheme, so it is not possible to determine whether this increase in costs would have resulted in the costs of 
the NBS exceeding the benefits.  The webpage only contains the Environment al Screening Report.  See fn 5 
above for references to this NBS webpage. 
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out the National Broadband Scheme.  Hence the new National Broadband Plan should set out the 
questions to be answered and issues to be addressed before final decisions concerning State 
intervention can be decided. 
There are, furthermore, gains to be made by waiting to make a decision on the degree of public 
support, if any, for high speed broadband rollout.  More and better evidence will become available 
as to whether or not the much touted benefits of high speed broadband exist and their magnitude.  
In this fast-changing sector new technologies may develop with lower costs of deployment or 
greater societal benefits.   Also, as the supply-side reforms in terms of removing regulatory and 
other barriers come into effect, the cost of any additional intervention that is needed to provide 
wider access should fall.  By waiting, policy makers will have more information and evidence on 
which to base their decisions.  As a result better more cost effective public policy should be the 
result.  This is a not inconsiderable factor to be taken into account in a period of austerity and tight 
controls on public expenditure.  
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